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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTH) \
This appeal * \ ras poui eel • > v ei ft c i n the I Itah Si lpre
empowering this court to decide this matter under I IT v < CODF ANN, § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STAN DARD U b RE \
Issue one:

l

Whether the trial court properly granted the motion to enforce the

settlement agreement and entry of bar order.
Standard

i

i. n

'i,

• ill ,* i IN .1 " ,n'«V

m,

i'»' • ' S"»> i'»dim*S\\

'

866

P.2d 581, 584 (Utah App. 1993).
Issue two:

Whether the trial court properly determined the legal effect of appellants'

n

5.
Standard of Review: Correctness. Ong Ml

(U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d

447, 455 (Utah 1993).
Issue three;

Whether the "trial court properly exercised its discretion to determine 'the

ultimate rights of appellants and appellees as between themselves pursuant to the motion to
enfoi.

. *.

Pursuant to, UTAH R. APP. P. 24(b), appellees are providing a statement of the issues because appellants have
misstated the issues, and in at least one respect the appropriate standard of review. For example, appellants contend
in issue 2, at page 2 of their brief, that an issue is whether "certain of the findings and conclusions in the Second
Amended Order, as the same may affect the rights of appellants in claims against appellants (sic) and as objected to
by appellants, supported (sic) by substantial and competent evidence?" They then, with reference to whether the
court properly applied 11 U.S.C. § 365, contend that a correctness standard applies. This statement of the issue is
far too broad and is not determined by a correctness standard. While conclusions of law are reviewed for
correctness, Ong Int'l, 850 P.2d at 455, factual findings are assessed based on a clearly erroneous standard. Alta
Indus Ltd v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993).

1

Standard of review: Abuse of discretion. UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(c)(1); Cheney v. Rucker,
381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963); Boil v. Nation Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 595 (Utah App.
1993).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the issues on appeal.
Rule 54(c¥n of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of
several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate
rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
11 U.S.C. § 365 (in relevant parf>
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c),
and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.
(b)(1) If there has been a default in any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of
such contract or lease, the trustee—
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly cure, such
default;
(B) compensate, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or lease, for any actual
pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or
lease.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that is a breach of a
provision relating to—
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the
closing of the case;
2

(B) the commencement of a case under this title: - *
(C) the appointment of or taking possession bv ,*. trustee ;n 3 case under this title
or a custodian before such commencement.
l.LU,S,CJL349
(a) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the dismissal of a case under this title
does not bar the discharge, in a later case under this title, of debts that were dischargable in the
case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of a case under this title prejudice the debtor with regard
to the filing of a subsequent petition under this title, except as provided in section 109(f) of this
title.
(b) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case other than under
section 742 of this title—
(1)
reinstates—
• (A) any proceeding or custodianship superseded 'under section 543 of this/title;
(B) any transfer avoided under section 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of
this title, or preserved under section 510(c)(2), 522(i)(2), or 551 of this title;
(2) vacates any order, judgment, or transfer ordered under section 522(i)(l), 542, 550, or
553 of this title; and
(3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested
immediately before the commencement of the case under this title.
S T A T E M E N T

O F T H E

CASK

Nature of the Case
This was an action by joint venturers to recover for the breach of fiduciary duty
cuiHA'niiojJi liiiil iiiiisiii.iina^criiiiil nil! ninl iiiiiiiii tui'l issils ill i IIIiin In iippHLmls and unnHlees fmplaintiffs below) shared certain Interests at "the time the action was brought.

iHy,

appellees had, prior to becoming joint venturers with appellants, transferred the interests of a
family partnership, EADAC Investment Company ("EADAC"), to a "trust.

3

Those interests consisted in the main of ownership interests in certain developed real
properties-mostly apartment complexes. Appellants were not originally involved in any way
with EADAC prior to the transfer of EADAC's assets to the trust. Appellants later became joint
venturers with appellees for the sole purpose of recovering, renovating and otherwise salvaging
the properties following mismanagement and waste by the trustees and their related entities.
This litigation was part of that joint effort against the trust to recover either the properties or their
respective values.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
The complaint was filed on May 20, 1991 and included claims for breach of fiduciary
duty, conversion, an accounting, mismanagement and injunctive relief, among others.

An

amended complaint was filed on July 11, 1991, adding additional claims for rescission and
dissolution of the trust to which EADAC's assets had been transferred. A second amended
complaint was filed on February 4, 1992, adding claims for breach of contract. The parties
exchanged motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss.
The issues on appeal have nothing to do with the merits of the case and arose late in the
case after appellees had reached a settlement with defendants without the involvement of
appellants. On December 22, 1993, appellees moved the court for approval of the settlement and
the entry of a bar order preventing appellants from bringing any claims against the settling
parties. The thrust of the motion was that the court enter an order to the effect that the settlement
between appellee and defendants (defendants are not parties to this appeal) was a final resolution

4

of this case, including the interests of appellants. Ihat motion, including a notice of hearing set
for December 23, 1993, was hand-delivered to counsel for appellants on December 2_.
A hearing w as held :)i:i December 23 a nci appella nts w ere represented by cuun&ci. The
court entered findings of feet, conclusions of law and an order on Decembc: 2~ ; n o "
December 29,
a

r

-

he court entered an amended order. Appellants objei

* -

filed on Januar

.
—*

._

n

a
o

,:viu, iyy*. A notice of hearing on the motion to amend was

hearing was he'd -n January — '994, and the court ordered that

the parties attenip

der concern ing the motion to

:

approve the settlemwxi. «&Aw*;ment and entr> oi bar order. A second amended order was entered
on March 4 *™A

A

- tice of appeal was filed on April 1, 1994. The appeal was poured over

f *
STATEMENT OF FACTS2
The state::,.

itullv oiii'iir! hut ditXitiill hi follow.

The following are the ke>

s on appeal.

On April 22, 1991, appellees entered .'into a what the parties have come to refer to as a
jiiniiii

I limn .jgreeiiMiiil

ill

n l h ? ' ? iili.itfini ,ts .'ulilcnilmn «1 I'll I |

I in - purpose oi' the

agreement was to enlist the aid of appellants in retrieving, improving and either managing or
selling certain properties, some ml »• .Iiu.h were threatened

mill uiivilosiui

ilim lt-nl been

Citations to the findings of fact are abbreviated FF, followed by 'the paragraph number of 'the second amended
order. (R. 3386-91, attached as appendix 3.

5

mismanaged by the defendants (who are not parties to this appeal). This litigation was part of
that joint effort to save those properties. (Tr. 67; FF 2.)
On June 25, 1992, appellees brought an action against appellants in the 160th District
Court of Dallas County, Texas, styled EADAC Investment Co., Angela M. Psarras and Earnest
Psarras v. Federal Leasing, Inc. and Lewis Butcher, cause no. 92-7821 (the "Texas action"). (R.
3226.) The crux of the Texas action was the ownership of one of the distressed properties
covered by the joint venture agreement. Id; FF 4-5. Appellees obtained a judgment in the Texas
action against appellants and another related entity on March 25, 1993, in the amount of $40,000.
(R. 3195.) The trial court in the Texas action entered declaratory relief as follows:
A.
The April 22, 1991, agreement between Plaintiffs, Eadac
Investment Company, Angela M. Psarras, and Defendants Federal Leasing, Inc.
and Lewis Butcher (the "Agreement"), a copy of which is attached to this Order as
Exhibit "A", is executory in nature and Defendants, Carnicero Dynasty
Corporation, Federal Leasing, Inc. and Lewis Butcher, have no rights, legal or
equitable to the following described real property situated in Dallas County,
Texas:
BEING ALL of Lot One, Block 8118 of the City of Dallas, Dallas County,
Texas, being also known as the WENCO ADDITION, as recorded in
Volume 68143, Page 2113 of the Deed Records of Dallas County, Texas,
and commonly known as the Kingsley Park North Apartments (hereinafter
referred to as the "Property").
B.
The Notice of Interest in Real Property, a copy of which is attached
to this Order as Exhibit "B" is a cloud upon Plaintiff Eadac Investment
Company's title to the Property and does not create any interest in the Property in
any of the Defendants.
C.
Any and all liens against the Property which are purportedly held
by Defendant Carnicero Dynasty Corporation by virtue of an assignment from
The Perm Mutual Life Insurance company, or otherwise are void.

6

D.
The Agreement does not provide, by Itself or b> reference to some
other existing writing, sufficient data or other means b> which the Property to be
conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty. As a result, the Agreement
is unenforceable as failing to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frai ids.
E.

Plaintiff Eadac Investment Company is the fee simple owner of the Property.

(R 3194-95; addei ldi u n 5; I : F 6 |
Immediately following the entr> of the judgmerr : < unst appellants in the Texas action,
appellants filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. (R. 3333, 3335:
uiiiisolnt.itnl ! if i I1"" H U i

Kill! ilm lilt

"he bankruptcy cases were later
^nnellees filed a motion in I he

consolidated bankruptcy case under 11 IJ.S.C, § 365 to force appellants to either accept or reject
the j oint venture agreement (By stipulation with appellees, appellants rejected the joint venture agreement on
November 10, 1993, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365. (R. 3337-38; FF 8.) That stipulation provides
i..* -

•• s :

EADAC Investment Company and Ernest and Angela Psarras (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Psarrases") and Wendell Butcher and Federal Leasing
Corporation (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Butcher") (Psarrases and
Butcher are hereinafter collectively referred to as "Party" or the "Parties") hereby
stipulate and agree as follows:
RECITALS
1
On or about April 22, 1991, Psarrases entered into an agreement
with Federal Leasing the ("Agreement"). A copy of the Agreement is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A."
2
i

y j ^ p^igg acknowledge that each Party asserts that the other Party
and breached the terms of the Agreement and that such alleged
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defaults and breaches make it impossible for Butcher to assume the Agreement
under 11 U.S.C. § 365.
3.
The Parties acknowledge that each Party asserts claims against the
other Party arising out of the alleged defaults and breaches of the Agreement and
that the Parties mutually dispute each other's claims.
3.[sic] On July 26, 1993, Psarrases filed a their [sic] Motion to Compel
Assumption Or Rejection Of Executory Contract (the "Motion"). The Motion
was set for a hearing on November 10, 1993, at 3:00 p.m.
4.
To save both sides the time and expense of conducting a full
hearing on the Motion, the parties hereby stipulate as follow:
STIPULATION
A.
The Agreement is an executory contract that is rejected pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 365, effective November 10,1993.
(R. 3337-38, addendum 6.)
The bankruptcy court entered an order rejecting the executory contract on November 22,
1993, stating that the joint venture agreement "is rejected pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365, effective
November 10, 1993." (R. 3349; addendum 7; FF 8.)

The bankruptcy case was ordered

dismissed on December 20, 1993. (FF 9.) An order of dismissal was entered on January 18,
1994. (R.3392.)
Meanwhile, appellees had been able to negotiate a settlement of this litigation. On
December 22, 1993, appellees filed a motion to approve the settlement and for the entry of a bar
order. (R. 3223.) That motion was supported by a memorandum, and included as exhibits the
joint venture agreement, the judgment from the Texas action and the stipulation to the rejection
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of the agreement. (R. 3225-31.) A hearing on this motion was held first on December 23, 1993,
(R. 3386), and again on January 14, 1994. (FF 10; Tr. 52.)
On Tuesday, December 21, 1993, written notice was provided to Butcher and Federal
Leasing of a December 23, 1993 Order to Show Cause hearing, which, by stipulation of the
parties was subsequently continued. On Wednesday, December 22, Butcher and Federal Leasing
were given further written notice of the December 23, 1993 hearing and of Plaintiffs' Motion.
Furthermore, despite having left messages with Butcher's and Federal Leasing's counsel of the
Motion and upcoming hearing beginning on Monday, December 20, 193, their counsel refused or
otherwise failed to return Plaintiffs' counsel's call until after the hearing. Butcher and Federal
Leasing received actual and adequate notice of the hearing at least 2 days prior to the December
23, 1993 hearing. (FF 10.)
Service of Plaintiffs' Motion and Notice of Hearing was not required upon Butcher and
Federal Leasing because the Agreement was null and void as a result of the Final Summary
Judgement in the Texas Case and the Stipulation and Order rejecting the Agreement, therefore
leaving Butcher and Federal Leasing without rights and claims thereunder, including all claims
set forth in this action. (FF 11.)
At the December 23, 1993 Hearing, the Court granted Butcher and Federal Leasing until
noon on Monday, December 27 to provide the Court with a written response to Plaintiffs'
Motion. Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing have filed any such written response. (FF 12.)
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The trial court entered an order consistent with the motion on December 27, 1993. (R.
3239-44; addendum 1.)

The court then entered an amended order, along with an order

dismissing the action on December 29, 1993. (R. 3251-52; addendum 2.) On January 10, 1994,
appellants filed an objection to the order of December 27 and the amended order of December
29, (R. 3265-69), and a hearing on the objection was set for January 14, 1994. (R. 3270-71;
Tr. 52.) Paul Moxley, counsel for defendants, and David McGrath, counsel for appellees, each
filed an affidavit in response to appellants1 objection. (R. 3274-83.)
Following the hearing on January 14, 1994, appellees filed a post-hearing memorandum.
(R. 3305-14.) This memorandum was objected to on February 1, 1994. (R.3371.) Appellants
submitted proposed findings and conclusions and a proposed order on January 19, 1994.
(R. 3358-62.) The trial court entered a second amended order on March 4, 1994. (R. 3386-91;
addendum 3.) This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADJUDICATED THE ISSUES
RAISED IN THE MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT AND
ENTRY OF BAR ORDER
A party need not plead every possible theory for a full resolution of the litigation in order

for the trial court to grant that kind of relief. This is particularly true when, at the end of the
litigation, the ultimate rights of co-parties need to be determined. The court may invoke its everpresent equitable powers to adjust the rights of co-parties, or it may look to no further than rule
54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for its authority. In this case, after appellants1
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voluntary egress from the case by severing their relationship with appellees, a final resolution of
the litigation required that the rights of the co-plaintiffs be determined. Although the motion
giving rise to this appeal was not captioned as one under rule 54(c)(1), it nevertheless sought the
relief that rule invites. There was no error in the court's adjudication on that score.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THE EFFECT OF
APPELLANTS' REJECTION OF THE JOINT
VENTURE
AGREEMENT UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 365
Rejection of an executory contract under 11 U.S.C. § 365 terminates the agreement and

severs the contractual relationship between the parties. That termination is not undone by a
dismissal of the bankruptcy case. Just as abandoned property is not revested on dismissal,
neither is a rejected contract. Indeed, because an executory contract never becomes property of
the estate until it is assumed, it cannot possibly revest if rejected. The trial court properly
determined that appellants1 rejection of the joint venture agreement, a contract they admitted was
"impossible" for them to assume, terminated the agreement and severed appellants from further
interest in the litigation. Appellants practically stipulated to this outcome when they offered
there own proposed findings and conclusions to that effect.
III.

APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN
CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, THUS
REQUIRING THIS COURT TO ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF
THOSE FINDINGS

Appellants venture a challenge to the trial court's findings of fact without first marshaling
the evidence that supports those findings. This court is not expected to cull that evidence from
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the record. Appellants must marshal or concede that the findings are correct. Here, they have
failed to first argue against themselves in order to then demonstrate that the evidence fails to
support the findings. Appellants compound their error by invoking an incorrect standard of
review with respect to factual findings. The trial court's findings are accurate and have, at any
rate, survived appellants' attack.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADJUDICATED THE ISSUES
RAISED IN THE MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT AND
ENTRY OF BAR ORDER
The law favors the complete resolution of a dispute. See Penrod v. NuCreation Creme,

Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). The rules of civil procedure rest on a policy of substance over
form, Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 457 (Utah App. 1991); Barlow v. Cappo, 821 P.2d 465,
466-67 (Utah App. 1991), and deciding cases "on the merits rather than pleading technicalities."
Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah 1989), citing Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp,
Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1983).
For these reasons, "everyfinaljudgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 54(c)(1). See also id. at rule 15(b)(failure to actually amend pleadings to

conform to matters actually litigated does not affect the judgment on those matters). To that end,
the judgment "may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the
parties on each side as between or among themselves." UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(c)(1).
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Required for rule 54(c)(1) to operate is only that the issue be raised in one form or
another and addressed by the parties. Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733,
735 (Utah 1984)(" Although Rule 54(c)(1) permits relief on grounds not pleaded, that rule does
not go so far as to authorize the granting of relief on issues neither raised nor tried.")
This requirement that the matters be raised, if not in the pleadings, then presumably by
motion, avoids prejudice to an opposing party. Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 P.2d 117, 119-20 (Utah
App. 1992) (rule 54(c)(1) applied to issue raised by motion). "If there is no prejudice, it is
necessary only that the relief granted be supported by the evidence and be a permissible form of
relief for the claims litigated." Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1263 (Utah 1987), quoted in
Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 472 (Utah App. 1988). See Mabey v. Kay Peterson
Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 290 (Utah 1984)(rule 54(c)(1) allows reformation of a document if
mutual mistake is established, even though issue not raised and reformation not requested in
pleadings).4
Since the distinctions between courts of equity and law have been abolished, UTAH R.
CIV. P. 2, the court may administer relief according to the nature of the cause before it. Wasatch
Oil Refining Co. v. Wade, 63 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1936). The rules, as already indicated, "must all

3

Utah's rule 54(c)(1) is identical to FED. R. Crv. P. 54(c), except that Utah has added the last sentence concerning
"the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves."
Combe, the decision in this area most often cited, is an example of what not to do. There, the trial court ignored
the pleadings, and despite the absence of any motions, entered findings "from whole cloth" and a judgment no one
had even contemplated. 680 P.2d at 735. The issue on which the court renders a decision must be raised in some
fashion. "It is error," the court held, "to adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and unsupported by the
record." Id. at 736. In Combe, as in this case, the trial court's findings were objected to "on the ground that they
went beyond the issues pleaded, tried and proved." 680 P.2d at 735. See Appellant's Brief at 20, et seq.
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be looked to in the light of their even more fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading
and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute." Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91.
With total resolution as the objective, the parties' participation in the court's effort is the
prerequisite:
What they are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet
them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules provide
for liberality to allow examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon
the controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other party to have a reasonable
time to meet a new issue if he so requests. Rule 15(b) . . . so states. It further
allows for an amendment to conform to the proof after trial or even after
judgment, and indicates that if the ends of justice so require, "failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues." This idea is confirmed by
Rule 54(c)(1) . . . .: "[Ejvery final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings."
Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91 (footnote omitted) (quoting UTAH R. Civ P. 54(c)(1)).
In Evans Products Co. v. West American Ins. Co., 736 P.2d 920 (3d. Cir. 1984), the court
held that relief not requested in the pleadings may nevertheless be awarded if the parties either
explicitly or implicitly consented to litigate the issue.

See also Kaszuk v. Bakery &

Confectionery Union, 791 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1986)(affirming summary judgment granting relief
neither pled nor specifically requested by motion—failure to amend did not preclude relief
requested late in the action). Cf Cioffe v. Morris, 676 F.2d 539 (11th Cir. 1982).
These rules, designed to end the dispute altogether, are rooted in ancient notions of
equity, and this is particularly true since the combining of actions at law and at equity.

14

1 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 242, at 456 (5th ed. 1941).5

The objective is that the

parties will never have to meet in court again on a matter related to the one that brought them
there in the first place.
It has elsewhere been observed (see § 114) that the governing motive of equity in
the administration of its remedial system is to grant foil relief, and to adjust in the
one suit the rights and duties of all parties, which really grow out of or are
connected with the subject-matter of that suit. It will readily be seen that this is
another example of the operation of the doctrine that equity, where possible, will
afford complete relief.
POMEROY'S,

§ 239a., at 449.7

5

There is, according to POMEROY'S a "fundamental conception" that a court will "strive to determine the entire
controversy, to award full and final relief, to do complete justice to all the litigants, whatever might be the amount
or nature of their interest..." This concept has become engrafted into the new rules:
This same grand principle is one of the fundamental and essential thoughts embodied in the
"reformed system of procedure," which first appeared in 1848, in the New York Code of Civil
Procedure, has since extended through so many states and territories of this country and colonies
of Great Britain, and was substantially adopted for England in the "Supreme Court of Judicature
Acts." That system of procedure, by combining the actions at law and suits in equity into one
"civil action," by permitting the union of legal and equitable primary rights, and interests, and
causes of action in the one judicial proceeding, and the granting of legal and equitable remedies in
the one judgment, and by the substitution of many equity rules concerning the prosecution of suits
in place of the arbitrary rules of the law regulating the conduct of actions, has greatly enlarged the
operation and increased the efficiency of the general doctrine under discussion.
POMEROY'S, § 242, at 456.
6

The principle of res judicata is based on this very notion. See Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App.
1990); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988).
In the footnote to this passage, the author cites to other cases in which the court, having decided the main dispute
between plaintiff and defendant, also decided the ultimate resolution between the co-plaintiffs. In Moss v. Thomas,
117 So. 648 (Ala. 1928), the main dispute concerned specific performance of a real estate sales contract, and the
court also resolved the issue of the commission owed to the broker by the vendor. Similarly, the court in Oelrichs v.
Spain, 15 Wall. (U.S.) 211 (1872) decided what plaintiffs as a group were owed on certain bonds, and then also
decided the shares owed to each plaintiff. See also Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 248 P. 329 (Okl. 1926).
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A.

The trial court's decision to adjudicate the rights of appellants and
appellees concerning the settlement was a proper exercise of its equity
powers.

A trial court's equitable powers are malleable, freeing the court's hand to fashion a
remedy according to the particular case before it. See Williamson v. Wanless, 545 P.2d 1145,
1148 (Utah 1976). The court's freedom in this regard is limited only by the notions of "fairness
and good conscience." Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). In Williamson,
the court outlined the broad contours of equitable relief:
The rules of equity arose as a means of avoiding or ameliorating the rigidities and
harshness of some of the rules and remedies of law . . . . The principles of equity
and justice are universal; they apply whenever appropriate and necessary to
enforce rights or to prevent oppression or unjustice.
545P.2datll48. 8
Equity thus allows the court "to recognize new and expanding remedies to meet new
situations." Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 300 P.2d 726, 728 (Cal. App. 1956), cert, denied, 352 U.S.
971 (1956). Part of a court's equity jurisdiction is the complete adjudication of all matters
between the parties "to accomplish full justice so as to prevent further litigation." Helman v.
Patterson, 241 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah 1952). See also Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 225 P.2d
739, 748-49 (Utah 1950) (court should decide all legal and equitable issues in a dispute when
given an opportunity to do so); Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank 591 P.2d 51, 58 (Cal.

The only limitation on the court's exercise of its equitable powers appears to be in the reformation of contracts,
where its "powers are narrowly bounded." Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985). In an action for
reformation, when courts are understandably "reluctant to change contractual obligations and rights," id, the court
may not "rewrite a contract to include terms never contemplated by the parties." Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690
P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984). There are no such limitations on the court's equitable powers in this case.
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1979) "A court of equity may exercise its full range of powers in order to accomplish complete
justice between the parties ....")
Indeed, by definition, the court's equity powers are never limited by precedent. Farrell v.
Placer County, 145 P.2d 570, 572 (Cal. 1944). Equity has always been outside such restraints:
Equity does not wait upon precedent which exactly squares with the facts in
controversy, but will assert itself in those situations where right and justice would
be defeated by for its intervention. "It has always been the pride of courts of
equity that they will so mold and adjust their decrees as to award substantial
justice according to the requirements of the varying complications that may be
presented to them for adjudication."
Id (quoting Humboldt Savings Bank v. McCleverty, 119 P. 82 (Cal. 1936). See also Sauer v.
Moffitt, 363 N.W. 269, 274 (Iowa App. 1984) (court "will devise a remedy to meet the situation
though no similar relief has been granted before").
In this case, appellees sought nothing more than a final determination of their rights vis-avis appellants. The fact that they were once allies in the litigation is unimportant because rule
54(c)(1) expressly invites the court to resolve the predictable disputes that can arise between coparties. Appellees wanted an end to this case-an end to their tortuous relationship with
appellants. Exercising its equity powers, the trial court granted just that. Although appellees did
not style their motion as one under rule 54(c)(1), that is clearly the substance of the relief they
were seeking. (R. 3230; Tr. 11.) "The title of a motion is not dispositive as to whether a court
9

Equity was born anciently precisely because of the limiting aspects of the king's writs. "[T]his failure led to the
origin and growth of the competing-and complimentary-system of equity." R. THOMPSON & J. SEBERT,
REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND RESTITUTION, § 3.01, 3-5 (1983). Now, of course, the distinctions between the

notions of law and equity are abolished as those distinctions once required different courts. See UTAH R. Civ. P. 2;
Marlowe Investment Corp. v. Radmall, 485 P.2d 1402 (Utah 1971); Williamson, 545 P.2d at 1148.
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can grant relief under the motion." Kunzler v. O'dell, 855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993). See
also, Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1991); Darrington, 812
P.2d at 457 (court will not elevate form over substance in granting relief requested by motion).
Appellants' only connection to this case was the joint venture agreement, an agreement a
Texas court had already determined had been breached.

(R. 3329-31.)

Appellants merely

broadened that breach when they rejected the contract under § 365. (See section II, infra.) The
trial court simply took these facts and resolved, because "the justice of the case require[d] it,"
"the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves."

UTAH

R.

CIV.

P. 54 (c)(1). There was no error in doing so.
B.

Appellants were not denied due process relative to the court9s grant of
the motion to approve the settlement and enter the bar order.

Due process "requires that litigants have their day in court." Copper State Thrift and
Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 391 (Utah App. 1987). "For purposes of due process, the parties
must receive notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise them of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id, citing
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
In Bruno, a due process challenge was defeated because there was in fact adequate notice-evidenced by appearance at the subject hearing. Full participation in the litigation giving rise to
the order from which the appeal is taken defeats a due process attack on that litigation. Id. See
also Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n., 657 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982).
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Appellants here lace their argument with references to their due process rights. (See
appellants' brief at 20.) Like the appellant in Bruno, appellants here received notice of the
hearing and the pendency of the motion and actually appeared to make their objections known.
(Tr. 3, 5.) Moreover, appellants succeeded in obtaining a second hearing (Tr. 52), and filed
objections to the court's orders. Appellants ultimately obtained three modifications to the order
from which this appeal is taken. (Cf addenda 1, 2 and 3.) Appellants can hardly complain now
that they were left out of the proceedings.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE EFFECT
OF APPELLANTS' REJECTION OF THE JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 365
A chapter 11 debtor may reject an executory contract deemed burdensome or not

beneficial to the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 365.10

"[Rejection [under § 365] constitutes a breach

immediately before the date of the filing of the petition. [T]he effect of rejection is that a breach
is deemed to exist which in the ordinary case will give rise to a claim for damages." 2 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, f

365.03, at 365-18, -19, f 365.08, at 365-54 (15th ed. 1994). See also In re

Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 595 (10th Cir. 1990); BSL Operating Corp. v. 125
East Taverns, Inc., 57 B.R. 945 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).11

A debtor in a chapter 11 case is under 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) the equivalent of a trustee.
An executory contract is generally one "on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides."
2 COLLIER, % 365.02. Appellants stipulated that the joint venture agreement was an executory contract. (R. 3338).
Rejection can also be treated as an abandonment of the contract by the debtor. Id at 365-55. Under 11 U.S.C. §
554, abandoned property is no longer property of the estate:
Under section 541, the trustee no longer takes title to the debtor's property, and, upon
abandonment under section 554, the trustee is simply divested of control of the property because it
is no longer part of the estate. Thus, abandonment constitutes a divestiture of all interests in
11
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Section 365's significance is that, unlike the presumption that the property of the debtor
becomes the property of the estate, the only "property" that passes when an executory contract is
involved is the right to assume or reject. In re Lovitt, 757 F.2d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied sub nom., Cheadle v. Appleatchee Riders Ass'n., 474 U.S. 849 (1985). The court in Lovitt
observed as follows:
Because executory contracts and leases involve future liabilities as well as
rights, . . . an affirmative act of assumption by the trustee is required to bring the
property into the estate in order to ensure that the estate is not charged with the
liabilities except upon due deliberation. Thus, executory contracts and leasesunlike all other assets-do not vest in the trustee as of the date of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. They vest only upon the trustee's timely and affirmative act
of assumption.
Because rejection of an executory contract is retroactive to the date of the
filing of the petition, such a contract never becomes a part of the bankrupt's estate.
Id, citing 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY f 70.43[1], at 516-17, 520 (14th ed. 1978); In re Frazin,
183 F. 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1910). See also Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM.

BANKR.

L.J. 293, 303 n. 31 (1983).12

property that were property of the estate. [Property may be abandoned to any party with a
possessory interest in it
COLLIER, t 554.02[2] (footnotes omitted). See also Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Term. Bank Nat, 826 F.2d 434, 437
n.2(6thCir. 1987).
12
Bordewieck & Countryman state as follows:
Were it not for § 365, all contracts and leases in which the debtor had a legal or equitable
prepetition interest would become property of the estate under § 541(aXl). Perhaps § 365 should
be viewed as a limitation on § 541(aXO giving the debtor, subject to court approval, an option to
decide whether executory contracts and unexpired leases should become property of the estate. If
they are rejected, they do not become property of the estate
Bordewieck & Countryman at 303.
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In In re Qintex Entertainment, Inc., 950 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1991), the court observed this
rule, which finds its roots in legal antiquity.13 The court stated that M[a]n executory contract does
not become an asset of the estate until it is assumed pursuant to § 365 of the Code." See also In
re TleeU 876 F.2d 769, 770 (9th Cir. 1989)("Unless and until rights under an executory contract
are timely and affirmatively assumed by the trustee, they do not become property of the debtor's
estate.")14
An executory contract, once rejected, does not revest in the debtor
upon dismissal
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this exception created by the right to reject a
contract under § 365:
The debtor's filing bankruptcy creates a bankruptcy estate, (comprised
with certain exceptions) of all the debtor's property and interests in property. This
estate is administered by a fiduciary representative, the "trustee," and is
considered a separate legal entity from the debtor. Under the Code, the debtor's
property automatically passes to the estate to be governed by the trustee.
However, section 365 of the Code creates an exception to the rule that a debtor's
property automatically passes to the estate. Under section 365, executory
contracts do not automatically vest in the estate, but enter it only upon assumption
by the trustee.
Cobabe v. Stanger, 844 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1992) (footnotes omitted); citing, et al, Lovitt, 757
F.2d at 1041; In re Tortry, 724 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Cochise College Park Inc.,

13

Though rooted in quaint notions of title, the idea is to give the trustee or the debtor in possession the option of
whether to remain a party to a given contract, which is consistent with the preservative purposes of the bankruptcy
act. See M. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection11 59 U.COLO. L.REV. 845
(1988), particularly the discussion concerning Copelandv. Stephens, 106 ENG. REP. 218 (K.B. 1818).
14
The search for a definition, or better, a description of an executory contract has not been easy. See Matter of
Executive Technology Data Systems, 79 B.R. 276,280 n.5 (Bkrtcy. E.D.Mich. 1987); In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 54-61
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703 F.2d 1339, 1352 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 793, 797 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 1982); 2
COLLIER,

§ 365.03; M. Andrew at 860-63 & n.76.

At issue in Cobabe was the effect of rejection on "the rights and obligations of the parties
to an executory contract for personal services." 844 P.2d at 301. There, however, the debtor,
despite the trustee's rejection, remained always "ready, willing and able to perform" under the
agreement. Id. at 302. Although ordinarily a rejection under § 365 constitutes a breach, Western
Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d at 595, that is not so when the contract is for personal services and
the Chapter 7 debtor remains capable and willing to perform. Cobabe, 844 P.2d at 302.
Rejection has several consequences. It is a breach, 11 U.S.C. § 365(g); it terminates the
agreement, R and O Elevator Co. v. Harmon, 93 B.R. 667, 671 (D.Minn. 1988) ("Rejection . . .
terminates the obligation of the parties under the contract."); and, except for the nondebtor's
claim for breach, effectively ends the relationship between the parties.
Rejection denies the right of the contracting creditor to require the debtor to
perform the executory portions of the contract; limits the creditors claim to
damage for breach of contract, and prohibits a rejecting debtor from compelling
the contracting creditor to perform the executory obligations.
In re Rudaw/Empirical Software Prod. Ltd, 83 B.R. 241, 246 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 1988),
citing LeasingServ. Corp., 826 F.2d at 436.

(Bkrtcy. D. Utah 1982). As happened in Executive Technology, this court need not join that search because the
parties stipulated that the agreement was executory. (R. 3337-38.) See 79 B.R. at 280-81 n.5.
15
This distinction, the court noted, is consistent with "the history and purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. Congress
could not have intended the inequities that would result if we were to allow the nondebtor party to a personal
services contract to abandon it or terminate it merely because the debtor party filed bankruptcy. The purpose of our
bankruptcy law is to give the debtor a fresh start." Cobabe, 844 P.2d at 302, citing Noonan, 17 B.R. at 800 {citing
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Rejection is not rescission, and does not "undo performances by the parties . .. which
have preceded the assumption or rejection. In re Metro Transp. Co., 87 B.R. 338, 343 (Bkrtcy.
E.D.Pa. 1988). "Property acquired prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy remains property
of the estate regardless of whether the trustee or debtor in possession assumes or rejects the
unperformed obligations of the contract pursuant to which the property was acquired." Executive
Technology, 79 B.R. at 282.
Dismissal of a case under § 349 operates ordinarily to restore the debtor to the status quo
ante, as though the case had never been brought. In re Lewis & Coulter, Inc., 159 B.R. 188
(Bkrtcy. W.D. Pa. 1993). Property rights are revested with the debtor upon dismissal. In re
Ethington, 150 B.R. 48 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 1993). Dismissal revests only "the property of the
estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of
the case under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 349 (b)(3).
"[T]he courts have refused to extend the reinstatement effect of section 349(b) beyond its
expressly enumerated provision." 2 COLLIER, § 349-11. See also Norton v. Hoxie State Bank, 61
B.R. 258, 260 (Bkrtcy. D. Kan. 1989) ("section 349(b)(2) affects only the specific actions
delineated in that subsection.") The Utah Supreme Court's decision in First Security Bank of
Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958 (Utah 1993) touches on but does not really address the issue in this
case created by appellants1 § 365 rejection. In Creech, the bank attempted to enforce an "ipso
facto" clause of a loan agreement, which provided that "the bank could hold the Creeches in

H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 125 (1977), U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 1978, 5787, 5963; Perez v.
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default, accelerate their monthly payments, and take immediate possession of the collateral if
they filed for bankruptcy." Creech, 858 P.2d at 961.
At issue was the bank's contention that the Creeches defaulted under the loan agreements
upon filing bankruptcy. Id. at 963. The court held that there was no default because the ipso
facto clause was unenforceable. Id. at 964. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B). There was no issue of
rejection in Creech. The debtors had negotiated new terms with the bank, which were then
incorporated into the plan of reorganization. Id. at 961. The default did not occur until postpetition. 858 P.2d at 968 (Howe, J. dissenting in part). Even Creech, however, recognizes
several exceptions to the rule concerning revesting under § 349. Id. at 964-65.
The court also noted, consistent with Cobabe, that "[sjection 349(b)(3) affects only
property of the estate." Creech, 858 P.2d at 966 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3)). Cf. In re
Polysat, Inc., 28 C.B.C.2d 1157, 1162 (Bkrtcy. E. D. Pa. 1993) (observing that unless rejected an
executory contract "continues in effect"), citing Smith v. Hill, 317 F.2d 539, 542 N.6 (9th Cir.
1963) (quoting 8 COLLIER, at 162 (14th ed.)
Appellants1 argument has already been rejected in BSL Operating, 57 B.R. 945. There,
the debtor argued that a lease it had rejected under § 365 was revested upon dismissal under
§ 349. The court noted that the purpose of § 349 "is to restore all property rights, as far as
practicable, to the positions they occupied at the commencement of a case that was dismissed

Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971); Watson v. Merrill, 136 F. 359, 363 (8th Cir. 1905).
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under one of the operative sections of title 11." Id. at 952 (emphasis in original) (quoting 2
COLLIER

§ 349.03, at 349-8.

The debtor's effort to undo its rejection, however, stretched § 349 too far. The court
refused to permit the debtor to select which sections of the bankruptcy code would apply.
"Having availed itself of the protection offered by the Code and the automatic stay by filing the
1984 case, [debtor] cannot now . . . complain because the operation of other Code provisions and
its own inaction resulted in the loss of the lease." Id, at 952.
The court held as follows:
[S]ection 349(b) lists the Code sections whose operative impact is specifically
undone unless the court orders otherwise. Thus dismissal under section 349(b)
reinstates in itemized fashion:
proceedings or custodianships that were
superseded by the bankruptcy case; avoided transfers; voided liens; vacates any
order, judgment or transfer ordered as a result of the avoidance of a transfer; and
revests the property of the estate in the entity in which the property was vested at
the commencement of the case. Id. Section 365 is not one of the enumerated
sections affected by a section 349(b) dismissal.
Construing section 349 as Taverns would have this court do would utterly
defeat the intent of section 365(d)(4). The two sections must be harmonized so
that one provision does not annul the other. In light of the flexibility inherent in
section 349, section 365(dX4) must be given effect in such a way as to prevent a
lessee's bankruptcy from holding a nondebtor lessor hostage to repeated filings.
BSL Operating Corp., 57 B.R. at 952.
Likewise, In re Searle, 70 B.R. 266 (D.R.I. 1987), assessed the reach of § 349's revesting
element. The question there was whether revesting "applies only to property remaining in the
bankruptcy estate at the time of dismissal, or whether it also applies to property that has been
distributed to creditors prior to dismissal." Id. at 270. It was argued that § 349 prevented the
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enforcement of a consent order under which the debtor, prior to dismissal, had been making
certain payments for real property.
The court rejected that argument because of the rights already acquired and relied on the
bankruptcy case itself:
The few cases that mention subsection 349(b)(3) refer to its applicability only in
the context of property or property rights that have not passed out of the
bankruptcy estates. See In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1985) (Wage
deductions received by Trustee before dismissal revest in debtor/wage-earner after
dismissal.); In re Groves, 27 B.R. 866 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) (Security interest in
undischarged debts revests in creditor after dismissal.); In re Beasley, 22 B.R.
773, n.l (Bankr.W.D. Tenn. 1982) (Debtor's mortgaged residence revests in
debtor subject to mortgage after dismissal.). These cases suggest that the
"property of the estate" that revests in its prior owners after dismissal includes
only the property left in the estate at the time of dismissal. This view is reinforced
by the legislative history of subsection 349(b). In a brief discussion of 349(b)'s
impact on property that has passed out of the estate prior to dismissal, the
legislative history states, "[wjhere there is a question over the scope of the
subsection, the court will make the appropriate order to protect rights acquired in
reliance on the bankruptcy case." S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5835.
These considerations lead me to conclude that neither subsection 349(b)(2)
nor 349(b)(3) deprives a Consent Order of its binding effect following dismissal
of the bankruptcy case.
Sear/e,70B.R.at271.
More than having already passed out of the estate, an executory contract ultimately
rejected never becomes part of the estate. Cobabe, 844 P.2d at 301. Appellants misread § 349
(and never address whether and how it squares with § 365). Appellants argue that they may file
for bankruptcy protection, enjoy the benefits of relief from creditors for nine months, stipulate
that it is "impossible" for them to assume the agreement (R. 3337), and then, when it is
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convenient, dismiss the bankruptcy case and pretend the stipulation, the rejection and the case
itself never happened. Section 349 does not work that way. See, e.g., In re Bernard, 69 B.R. 13,
14-15 (Bkrtcy. D.Haw. 1986) (a determination that a lease survives rejection frustrates the
purpose behind § 365(d)(4).
Moreover, a debtor may not assume an executory contract unless it can satisfy three
statutory requirements: (1) the debtor must cure or provide adequate assurance that the default
will be cured; (2) compensate or adequately assure compensation for the default; and (3) provide
adequate assurance of future performance under the contract

11 U.S.C § 365(b)(l)(A)-(C).

When appellants stipulated that it was "impossible" to assume the joint venture agreement, they
stipulated that it was impossible to cure the existing defaults, impossible to compensate appellees
and impossible to provide assurance of future performance The agreement was terminated.
Harmon, 93 B.R. at 671. Appellants1 rejection of the joint venture agreement mercifully ended
their relationship with appellees. The trial court's ruling in that regard, therefore, was correct.
(R. 3390) ("Butcher's and Federal Leasing's rejection of the Agreement. . . operated as a matter
of law to terminate the Agreement")
Appellees merely invoked the trial court's ever-present power to fully resolve a lawsuit by
determining "the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves."
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 54(c)(1). Based on a motion properly brought by appellees, the court was asked

to determine the relationship between co-plaintiffs based on the only link between them-the
joint venture agreement (R. 3366, f 1.) The court determined that appellant's rejection of the
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agreement severed them from this litigation, and thus from any participation in the settlement.
(FF 2-6.)
The trial court also had the benefit of the judgment in the Texas action, where appellant's
rights under the agreement were litigated.

The Texas court found that the joint venture

agreement was executory and otherwise unenforceable. (R. 3329-31.) Finally, the trial court had
the benefit of appellants' own proposed findings and conclusions in which they essentially
stipulated to the very result they now appeal. Appellants proposed as follows:
The involvement of Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing, Inc., in the
above lawsuit and their respective claims alleged in the pleadings arise out of an
agreement dated April 22, 1991 with other parties in this lawsuit, which
agreement by Stipulation and Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court, has
been rejected and said contract has been determined by said Court to be nonexecutory and Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing, Inc. have, therefore,
no longer any right to assert any interest or claims in the proceedings now
pending before this court.
(R. 3365.) (Cf. Conclusions of Law at If 3-5.)16
III.

APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN
CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, THUS
REQUIRING THIS COURT TO ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF
THOSE FINDINGS.

A trial court's findings of fact enjoy a resumption of correctness and "will not be
overturned unless . . . clearly erroneous." College Irr. Co. v. Logan R. & Blacksmith Fork Irr.
Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1989). To overcome this presumption, an appellant must
Appellants challenge one of the trial court's findings on the basis that it is "misleading." (Appellants' Brief at
35.) An appeal is not the time in which to argue for a modification to a finding of fact. Appellants should have
sought an amendment under rule 52(b). In any event, the finding that an opportunity to respond in writing was
granted and declined is correct. (Tr. 47-50.) (See FF 12.)
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"marshal all of the evidence in support of the findings of the trial court and . . . then demonstrate
that even when viewed in the light most favorable to the factual determination of the trial court,
the evidence is insufficient to support its findings." Id.
A challenge to a trial court's factual findings caries a "heavy burden"; when that burden is
"not properly discharged, [the appellate court will] refuse to consider the merits of challenges to
the findings and [will] accept the findings as valid." Mountain States Broadcasting, 783 P.2d at
553. See also College Irr. Co., 780 P.2d at 1244 (failure to marshal is "in and of itself,
dispositive of [the] challenges to the trial court's findings of fact.")
After acknowledging an appellant's burden on appeal, the court in Doelle refused to
disturb the trial court's findings because the appellant's brief presented "the conflicting evidence
in a light most favorable to his position and largely ignorefd] the contrary evidence." Doelle, at
1178. This court reached a similar result in Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App.
1989).
Marchant involved the appellant's claim to a prescriptive easement, which had been
denied by the trial court. On appeal, the appellant failed to marshal the evidence supporting the
court's finding, arguing instead that the finding was not supported by the evidence. Id. at 682.

Accord Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991);
Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah App. 1990); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783
P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989), reWg denied.
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The court refused to consider such "conclusory arguments without citation to either the record or
cases involving pivotal issues." Id.
Appellants here offer a challenge to the trial court's findings of fact at page 25 of their
brief They then urge this court to apply a "substantial and competent evidence" test to that
challenge-using a Kansas supreme court case as authority. A trial court's findings of fact are
reviewed based on a standard of clear error. Alta Indus., 846 P.2d at 1286. Rule 52(a) provides
in this regard that "[fjindings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous

"

There was much more before the trial court than the Texas judgment and the § 365
rejection stipulation. The transcript of the two hearings, for example, contains numerous proffers
and references to evidence the trial court considered in making its findings. See, e.g., Tr. at 44.)
Using an incorrect standard to attack the trial court's findings, appellants have failed to marshal.
Therefore, the findings are presumed true.
CONCLUSION
The trial court, at the end of a complex and bitterly disputed case, and at the instance of
appellees, merely determined the ultimaterightsof co-plaintiffs with respect to the subject matter
of the litigation. The trial court concluded correctly that appellants had essentially abandoned
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Marchant also observed that an appellant's duty to marshal the evidence is essentially two-fold: the appellant
must marshal all the evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate the insufficiency of that evidence. The
appellant must also "marshal evidence which would support each element required to prove their claim of
prescriptive easement." Id. at 682. The court's refusal to upset the trial court's findings was apparently based on the
appellant's failure to accomplish either of these tasks.
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the case and that the settlement between appellees and defendants ended this matter among all of
the parties.

Whether the trial court acted properly is not decided based on whether an

amendment of the pleadings was required-it clearly was not. Finally, in wrapping up this
litigation as it did, the trial court made several factual findings, now ostensibly challenged on
appeal. Without first marshaling the evidence to support those findings, however, appellants'
attack is repulsed before it begins.
This court should affirm the trial court's order.
DATED this S

day of January, 1995.
Respectfully submitted,
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034

DAVID C. WRIGHT
Attorneys for Appellees
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ADDENDUM

Tabl

Douglas J. Parry, Esq. (#2531)
PARRY MURRAY WARD & CANNON
Attorneys for Plaintiff EADAC
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FEDERAL LEASING, INC., and
EADAC, a partnership,
Plaintiffs,

UTAH MANAGEMENT AND
INVESTMENTS, INC., a UTAH
corporation; et al.,

ORDER

Civil No. 910903217 CV

Judge Michael K. Burton
Defendants.

THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of
Settlement and Entry of Bar Order ("Motion"); the motion having been argued in open
court at 10:30 a.m. on Thursday, December 23, 1993, appearances having been made
by Doulas J. Parry and David M. McGrath for Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras and
Manivest Corporationlpaul T. Moxley for Defendants and David H. Day for Wendell Lewis

9

%
%

Butcher and Federal Leasing, Inc.; and the Court being fully advised in the premises and
for good cause shown, makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

On April 22, 1991 EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras and

Manivest Corporation (together the "Plaintiffs") entered into an agreement ("Agreement")
with Wendell Lewis Butcher ("Butcher") and Federal Leasing, Inc. ("Federal Leasing").
2.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Butcher and Federal Leasing

were to assume responsibility for refinancing, renovating, managing, maintaining and
liquidating certain properties formerly held by Plaintiffs (the "Properties").
3.

In exchange for their services, Butcher and Federal Leasing were to

receive 50% of the net proceeds upon final liquidation and accounting pertaining to the
Properties.
4.

One of the Properties identified in the Agreement was the Kingsley

Park Apartments, located in Dallas, Texas ("the Kingsley Property").
5.

Upon contracting to sell the Kingsley Property, a dispute arose

between Plaintiffs and Butcher/Federal Leasing as to the enforceability of the Agreement.
As a consequence, EADAC filed an action against Federal Leasing and Butcher in the
District Court of Dallas County, Texas, Case No. 92-7821 -H (the "Texas Case").
6.

By means of a Final Summary Judgment, the Texas Case court

granted Plaintiffs declaratory relief, ruling that the Agreement was "executory in nature,"
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and that Butcher and Federal Leasing had no rights thereunder due to the fact that
neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing had performed thereunder.
7.

Subsequent to execution of the Agreement, Butcher and Federal

Leasing filed for relief under the federal bankruptcy laws ("Bankruptcy Cases").
8.

By Stipulation dated November 10, 1993, Butcher and Federal

Leasing stipulated with EADAC and Earnest and Angela Psarras that the Agreement is an
executory contract and they rejected it pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365.
9.

The Bankruptcy Cases were ordered dismissed from the bench of the

Bankruptcy Court on Monday, December 20, 1993. Pursuant to this Stipulation, the
Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Rejecting Executory Contract.
10.

On Tuesday, December 21, 1993 written notice was provided to

Butcher and Federal Leasing of a December 23, 1993 Order to Show Cause hearing,
which, by stipulation of the parties was subsequently continued.

On Wednesday,

December 22, Butcher and Federal Leasing were given further written notice of the
December 23, 1993 hearing and of Plaintiffs' Motion. Furthermore, despite having left
messages with Butcher's and Federal Leasing's counsel of the Motion and upcoming
hearing beginning on Monday, December 20, 1993, their counsel refused or otherwise
failed to return Plaintiffs' counsel's call until after the hearing.

Butcher and Federal

Leasing received actual and adequate notice of the hearing at least 2 days prior to the
December 23, 1993 hearing.

11.

Service of Plaintiffs' Motion and Notice of Hearing was not required

upon Butcher and Federal Leasing because the Agreement was null and void as a result
of the Final Summary Judgement in the Texas Case and the Stipulation and Order
rejecting the Agreement, therefore leaving Butcher and Federal Leasing without rights and
claims thereunder, including all claims set forth in this action.
12.

At the December 23, 1993 Hearing, the Court granted Butcher and

Federal Leasing until noon on Monday, December 27 to provide the Court with a written
response to Plaintiffs1 Motion. Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing have filed any such
written response.
13.

The following parties to this action are desirous of entering into an

agreement as a means of resolving and settling all claims hereunder ("Settlement
Agreement"): EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, Con Psarras, Con Psarras as
guardian for the minor, Katherine Psarras, Anthony Psarras, Daniel Psarras, Utah
Management & Investment, Inc., the Manivest Liquidating Trust, Swen Mortenson, Larry
K. Leeper, Herbert A. Meistreich, Phillip M. McLaughlin, Michael M. Tulman, Elliot Wolfe
and Stephen Wyatt (collectively, the "Settling Parties").
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

As a result of the Final Summary Judgment rendered in the Texas

Case, Butcher and Federal Leasing are collaterally estopped from asserting rights or
claims against any party to this action.

2.

Butcher's and Federal Leasing's rejection of the Agreement in the

Bankruptcy Court proceeding operated as a matter of law to terminate the Agreement.
Consequently, Butcher and Federal Leasing relinquished and waived any and all rights
which they may have had under the Agreement when they rejected the Agreen ant.
3.

Butcher's and Federal Leasing's claims in this lawsuit, if any, are

wholly contingent upon the terms of the Agreement.
4.

Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under the

Agreement, they likewise have no rights in this lawsuit.
5.

Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under the

Agreement or in this lawsuit, they were not entitled to notice of Plaintiffs Motion and of the
December 23, 1993 hearing (notwithstanding that actual and adequate notice was
nonetheless provided them).
6.

Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing are necessary parties to any

settlement agreement which has been or will be reached in this lawsuit.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The Settlement Agreement by and between the Settling Parties will

terminate this action with prejudice as to all parties.
2.

Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under any settlment

agreement entered into by and between the Settling Parties, other than as expressly set
forth therein.
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3.

Butcher and Federal Leasing and their heirs, assigns, predecessors,

and successors in intersts are barred from asserting against any party to this lawsuit, any
right or claim contained in the pleadings of this lawsuit and any right or claim which is or
will be settled pursuant to a settlement agreement by and between the Settling Parties.
DATED this ^ / d a y of December 1993.

BY THE COURT:

JUDGE MICHAEL K. BUfTON • ^
'o

rv,;„:
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Douglas J. Parry, Esq. (#2531)
David M. McGrath, Esq. (#6276)
PARRY MURRAY WARD & CANNON
Attorneys for Plaintiff EADAC
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FEDERAL LEASING, INC., and
EADAC, a partnership,
Plaintiffs,

\

AMENDED ORDER

v.
UTAH MANAGEMENT AND
INVESTMENTS, INC., a UTAH
corporation; et al.,

Civil No. 910903217 CV

Judge Michael K. Burton
Defendants.

THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of
Settlement and Entry of Bar Order ("Motion"); the motion having been argued in open
court at 10:30 a.m. on Thursday, December 23,1993, appearances having been made
by Douglas J. Parry and David M. McGrath for EADAC, Ernest Psarras and Angela
Psarras, Paul T. Moxley for Defendants and David H. Day for Wendell Lewis Butcher and

Federal Leasing, Inc.; and the Court being fully advised in the premises and for good
cause shown, makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

On April 22, 1991 EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras and

Manivest Corporation (together the "Plaintiffs") entered into an agreement ("Agreement")
with Wendell Lewis Butcher ("Butcher") and Federal Leasing, Inc. ("Federal Leasing").
2.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Butcher and Federal Leasing

were to assume responsibility for refinancing, renovating, managing, maintaining and
liquidating certain properties formerly held by Plaintiffs (the "Properties").
3.

In exchange for their services, Butcher and Federal Leasing were to

receive 50% of the net proceeds upon final liquidation and accounting pertaining to the
Properties.
4.

One of the Properties identified in the Agreement was the Kingsley

Park Apartments, located in Dallas, Texas (the Kingsley Property").
5.

Upon contracting to sell the Kingsley Property, a dispute arose

between Plaintiffs and Butcher/Federal Leasing as to the enforceability of the Agreement.
As a consequence, EADAC filed an action against Federal Leasing and Butcher in the
District Court of Dallas County, Texas, Case No. 92-7821-H (the 'Texas Case").
6.

By means of a Final Summary Judgment, the Texas Case court

granted Plaintiffs declaratory relief, ruling that the Agreement was "executory in nature,"
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and that Butcher and Federal Leasing had no rights thereunder due to the fact that
neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing had performed thereunder.
7.

Subsequent to execution of the Agreement, Butcher and Federal

Leasing filed for relief under the federal bankruptcy laws ("Bankruptcy Cases").
8.

By Stipulation dated November 10, 1993, Butcher and Federal

Leasing stipulated with EADAC and Earnest and Angela Psarras that the Agreement is an
executory contract and they rejected it pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365.
9.

The Bankruptcy Cases were ordered dismissed from the bench of the

Bankruptcy Court on Monday, December 20, 1993. Pursuant to this Stipulation, the
Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Rejecting Executory Contract.
10.

On Tuesday, December 21, 1993 written notice was provided to

Butcher and Federal Leasing of a December 23, 1993 Order to Show Cause hearing,
which, by stipulation of the parties was subsequently continued.

On Wednesday,

December 22, Butcher and Federal Leasing were given further written notice of the
December 23, 1993 hearing and of Plaintiffs' Motion. Furthermore, despite having left
messages with Butcher's and Federal Leasing's counsel of the Motion and upcoming
hearing beginning on Monday, December 20, 1993, their counsel refused or otherwise
failed to return Plaintiffs' counsel's call until after the hearing. Butcher and Federal
Leasing received actual and adequate notice of the hearing at least 2 days prior to the
December 23,1993 hearing.
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11.

Service of Plaintiffs' Motion and Notice of Hearing was not required

upon Butcher and Federal Leasing because the Agreement was null and void as a result
of the Final Summary Judgement in the Texas Case and the Stipulation and Order
rejecting the Agreement, therefore leaving Butcher and Federal Leasing without rights and
claims thereunder, including all claims set forth in this action.
12.

At the December 23, 1993 Hearing, the Court granted Butcher and

Federal Leasing until noon on Monday, December 27 to provide the Court with a written
response to Plaintiffs' Motion. Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing have filed any such
written response.
13.

The following parties to this action are desirous of entering into an

agreement as a means of resolving and settling all claims hereunder ("Settlement
Agreement"): EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, Con Psarras, Con Psarras as
guardian for the minor, Katherine Psarras, Anthony Psarras, Daniel Psarras, Utah
Management & Investment, Inc., the Manivest Liquidating Trust, Swen Mortenson, Larry
K. Leeper, Herbert A. Meistreich, Phillip M. McLaughlin, Michael M. Tulman, Elliot Wolfe
and Stephen Wyatt (collectively, the "Settling Parties").
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

As a result of the Final Summary Judgment rendered in the Texas

Case, Butcher and Federal Leasing are collaterally estopped from asserting against any
party to this action any rights or claims arising out of the substance of this litigation.

2.

Butcher's and Federal Leasing's rejection of the Agreement in the

Bankruptcy Court proceeding operated as a matter of law to terminate the Agreement.
3.

Butcher's and Federal Leasing's claims in this lawsuit, if any, are

wholly contingent upon the terms of the Agreement.
4.

Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under the

Agreement, they likewise have no rights in this lawsuit.
5.

Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under the

Agreement or in this lawsuit, they were not entitled to notice of Plaintiffs Motion and of the
December 23, 1993 hearing (notwithstanding that actual and adequate notice was
nonetheless provided them).
6.

Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing are necessary parties to any

settlement agreement which has been or will be reached in this lawsuit.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The Settlement Agreement by and between the Settling Parties will

terminate this action with prejudice as to all parties.
2.

Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under any settlement

agreement entered into by and between the Settling Parties, other than as expressly set
forth therein.

3.

Butcher and Federal Leasing and their heirs, assigns, predecessors,

and successors in interests are barred from asserting against any party to this lawsuit,
any right or claim contained in the pleadings of this lawsuit.
DATED this

day of December 1993.

BY THE COURT:

JUDGE MICHAEL K. BURTON
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

PAUL T. MOXLEY, Attorney for Defenc

;s
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Douglas J. Parry, Esq. (#2531)
David M. McGrath, Esq. (#6276)
PARRY MURRAY WARD & CANNON
Attorneys for Plaintiff EADAC
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FEDERAL LEASING, INC., and
EADAC, a partnership,
SECOND AMENDED ORDER

Plaintiffs,
V.

UTAH MANAGEMENT AND
INVESTMENTS, INC., a UTAH
corporation; et al.,

Civil No. 910903217 CV

Judge Michael K. Burton
Defendants.

THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Approval of
Settlement and Entry of Bar Order ("Motion"); the motion having been argued in open
court at 10:30 a.m. on Thursday, December 23, 1993, appearances having been made
by Douglas J. Parry and David M. McGrath for EADAC, Ernest Psarras and Angela
Psarras, Paul T. Moxley for Defendants and David H. Day for Wendell Lewis Butcher and
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Federal Leasing, Inc.; and the Court being fully advised in the premises and for good
cause shown, makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

On April 22, 1991 EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras and

Manivest Corporation (together the "Plaintiffs'') entered into an agreement ("Agreement")
with Wendell Lewis Butcher ("Butcher") and Federal Leasing, Inc. ("Federal Leasing").
2.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Butcher and Federal Leasing

were to assume responsibility for refinancing, renovating, managing, maintaining and
liquidating certain properties formerly held by Plaintiffs (the "Properties").
3.

In exchange for their services, Butcher and Federal Leasing were to

receive 50% of the net proceeds uponfinalliquidation and accounting pertaining to the
Properties.
4.

One of the Properties identified in the Agreement was the Wngsley

Park Apartments, located in Dallas, Texas ("the Wngsley Property").
5.

Upon contracting to sell the Wngsley Property, a dispute arose

between Plaintiffs and Butcher/Federal Leasing as to the enforceability of the Agreement
As a consequence, EADAC filed an action against Federal Leasing and Butcher in the
District Court of Dallas County, Texas, Case No. 92-7821-H (the Texas Case").
6.

By means of a Final Summary Judgment the Texas Case court

granted Plaintiffs declaratory relief, ruling that the Agreement was "executory in nature,"
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and that Butcher and Federal Leasing had no rights thereunder due to the fact that
neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing had performed thereunder.
7.

Subsequent to execution of the Agreement, Butcher and Federal

Leasing filed for relief under the federal bankruptcy laws ("Bankruptcy Cases").
8.

By Stipulation dated November 10, 1993, Butcher and Federal

Leasing stipulated with EADAC and Earnest and Angela Psarras that the Agreement is an
executory contract and they rejected it pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365. Pursuant to this
Stipulation, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Rejecting Executory Contract.
9.

The Bankruptcy Cases were ordered dismissed from the bench by

the Bankruptcy Court on Monday, December 20, 1993.
10.

On Tuesday, December 21, 1993 written notice was provided to

Butcher and Federal Leasing of a December 23, 1993 Order to Show Cause hearing,
which, by stipulation of the parties was subsequentiy continued.

On Wednesday,

December 22, Butcher and Federal Leasing were given further written notice of the
December 23, 1993 hearing and of Plaintiffs' Motion. Furthermore, despite having left
messages with Butcher's and Federal Leasing's counsel of the Motion and upcoming
hearing beginning on Monday, December 20, 1993, their counsel refused or otherwise
failed to return Plaintiffs' counsel's call until after the hearing. Butcher and Federal
Leasing received actual and adequate notice of the hearing at least 2 days prior to the
December 23, 1993 hearing.

-3-
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11.

Service of Plaintiffs' Motion and Notice of Hearing was not required

upon Butcher and Federal Leasing because the Agreement was null and void as a result
of the Final Summary Judgement in the Texas Case and the Stipulation and Order
rejecting the Agreement, therefore leaving Butcher and Federal Leasing without rights and
claims thereunder, including all claims set forth in this action.
12.

At the December 23, 1993 Hearing, the Court granted Butcher and

Federal Leasing until noon on Monday, December 27 to provide the Court with a written
response to Plaintiffs' Motion. Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing have filed any such
written response.
13.

The following parties to this action are desirous of entering into an

agreement as a means of resolving and settling all claims hereunder ("Settlement
Agreement"): EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, Con Psarras, Con Psarras as
guardian for the minor, Katherine Psarras, Anthony Psarras, Daniel Psarras, Utah
Management & Investment, Inc., the Manivest Liquidating Trust, Swen Mortenson, Larry
K. Leeper, Herbert A. Meistreich, Phillip M. McLaughlin, Michael M. Tuiman, Elliot Wolfe
and Stephen Wyatt (collectively, the "Settling Parties").
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

As a result of the Final Summary Judgment rendered in the Texas

Case, Butcher and Federal Leasing are collaterally estopped from asserting against any
party to this action any rights or claims arising out of the substance of this litigation.

-4-
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2.

Butcher's and Federal Leasing's rejection of the Agreement in the

Bankruptcy Court proceeding operated as a matter of law to terminate the Agreement
3.

Butcher's and Federal Leasing's claims in this lawsuit, if any, are

wholly contingent upon the terms of the Agreement
4.

Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under the

Agreement, they likewise have no rights in this lawsuit.
5.

Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under the

Agreement or in this lawsuit, they were not entitled to notice of Plaintiffs Motion and of the
December 23, 1993 hearing (notwithstanding that actual and adequate notice was
nonetheless provided them).
6.

Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing are necessary parties to any

settlement agreement which has been or will be reached in this lawsuit
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The settlement agreement by and between the Settling Parties will

terminate this action with prejudice as to all parties.
2.

Whereas, Butcher and Federal Leasing's rights in the law suit were

terminated and whereas they are not parties to the Settlement Agreement, except as
expressly set forth therein, the Settlement Agreement does not create or confer upon
Butcher or Federal Leasing any rights therein. However, this paragraph does not affect

^

0

the rights Federal Leasing or Butcher may have to the

proceeds of the settlement

pursuant to some other agreement
***4 r?~-i

1

*wmt*m* uiuii 11 LUI iiuii ILIW
DATED this ^ T day of Januuy IQ, 1994.

BY THE COURT:

JUDGE-MICHAEL K. B U j f r a j i r :
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AGREEMENT
This agreement made in Salt Lake City, Utah, on this 22nd day
of April, 1991 by and between EADAC, a Utah Partnership,
Em&a-t

Psarras, Angela Psarras and Manivest Corporation,

hereinafter collectively referred to as Owners and Federal
Leasing Inc., a Utah Corporation and Lewis Butcher
hereinafter collectively referred to as Developer.
WITNESSETH:
PARTIES RECITE:
1. Owners own certain properties, contracts and cash
flow which holdings have been* assigned to Manivest
Liquidating Trust: •
2. The properties and contracts now known which were
transferred to the said Manivest Trust: by Owners are
set: forth as Exhibit (A) annexed hereto• The. said
properties and any other properties hereafter agreed
by: the parties hereto-be included in this joint
venture will be handled, managed and disposed of as
set: forth below.
3* The said properties have been mismanaged, foreclosed
upon or generally, devalued* In order to protect the
remaining values of the properties, assigned to
Manivest Liquidating Trust and to recoup from those
responsible, damages suffered by the properties, the
parties hereto intend to, upon consultation among
themselves, institute legal action against the
Manivest Liquidating Trust, the Trustees of said
62
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EXHIBIT "A"

Trust and -the management company hired by the said
Trust.
4. The Owners desire the Developer to assume full
responsibility of refinancing, renovating, -managing,
maintaining and liquidating the

said properties to

the best of their abilities.
5. In connection with the activities said forth in
paragraph 4 above. Lewis Butchers states that he has
an interest in Carnicero Dynasty, a Colorado
Corporation and will use his best efforts to affect
the hypothecation of securities controlled by said
Carnicero. Securities

to he used as a reserve account

for any loan where such a reserve is required by a
lender for any loan* Developer may need these
Securities from time to time to secure or refinance
the said properties.

It is expressly understood that

Carnicero will be paid a tee upon the refinancing or
sale of each property handled, which fee shall be
paid out of escrow of the particular property.
6. Owners-own 2 condominiums in Coronado,. California
which condominiums were wrongfully mortgaged by the
said Trust to First Security Bank of Utah for
approximately $800,000.00 and which properties the
owners want back in their former condition.
7. .Ernest Psarras has at .present a Deficiency Judgement.
against him~in sum of $2,000,000.00 and wishes this
joint-venture to' assume the same.
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8. Richard Bigl'er, not a party to this agreement,
brought the parties together and parties agree that
said Bigler is entitled to a finders fee for his
efforts.
Parties agree:
a. The Owners will assign all of their, rights, title and
interest in the said contracts and properties to
Owners and Developer as tenants in common.
b. Any cash generated from the sale or refinancing of
the properties shall be distributed on the 10th day
of each and every month as follows:
1. Any outstanding liens upon the properties
brought current to date.
2. Repay to Developer any costs and expenses
incurred in the management, operation and
liquidating of the said paper and
properties hereunder*
3* Sufficient cash to pay amount due on a
Master Charge card to be obtained by the

A• ? _
r^

j o i n t venture i n t h e name o f Lewis Butcher,

-

t o be used by him f o r

y

joint-venture

business related c o s t s .
4.

Upon t h e recovery by t h e D e v e l o p e r o f t h e
p r o p e r t i e s , c o n t r a c t s and c a s h f l o w ,

Id

t h e money being s u f f i c i e n t

Of.

and

t o pay a l l

p a y m e n t s , mortgages and o v e r h e a d

expenses

of operating, this joint-venture shall pay
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to-EADAC Investments, for properties
previously placed in Manivest Liquidating
Trust, the sum of 312,500.00 per month for
a 3 year period or until all such
properties and contracts are sold or
liquidated, which ever comes first.
5. At the closing of each escrow sale or
refinancing made by Developer through the
services of Caraicero, Carnicero shall be
paid a fee "up front".
C. This agreement shall be terminated one month
following the final completed liquidation of the
contracts and properties which have time to time been
brought in by this agreement.
D. The amount of a finders fee for Richard Blgler shall
be determined by-Ernest psarras and the said amount
will be subject* to -approval *by Lewis Butcher*
E. The parties will cooperate in the execution of all
Instruments necessary to refinance, mortgage or sell
any or all of the properties where it is deemed
necessary by Developer for the refinancing,
reconstruction# management and general maintenance of
any or all of the properties*
F* All parties will cooperate in the bringing of any or
all partnerships, now being managed by Manivest
Liquidating Trust to be managed under this venture
agreement.
65
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G. Upon the final liquidation and accounting under this
agreement the Owners-and Developer shall each receive
50% of the net proceeds less direct costs incurred in
maintenance of the properties.
H. Developer shall be reimbursed for all costs and
expenses incurred by Developer in ascertaining
the history of the properties. This includes all
contracts now controlled or having herebefore been
sold or disposed of by Manivest Liquidating Trust.

IN WITNESS HEREOF the parties hereto have set their hands and
seals in the place and on the date first above mentioned *

^

OWNERS

DEVELOPER

EADAC,-a oogpopation
By.
ralOpar-Cner
Gener
al<

Federal Leasing, Inc.

atiM**"

/Zu^**' L.Kg,,
fr&t*-'*
^Ernest Psarras, Individually

vidually

AngeJ/a Psarras, individually
Manivest Corporation
>>£*~- *?

Bv^S

(j^AnrL&f
LOrT/Uftf
66-

EXHIBIT A
CLIST OF PROPERTIES)
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ALTOONA PARKWAY (DALLAS, TEX) 252 UNITS
AMERADA (DALLAS, TX)
AMESBURY
AVENUE PLAZA
•BONNEVILLA APARTMENTS (OGDEN, UTAH)
BONNEVILLE MANOR APARTMENTS (BOUNTIFUL, UTAH)
BRASS LAMP (RICLAND, WASH) 28 UNITS
CAESAR'S PALACE APARTMENTS <RENO, NEVADA)
CARRIAGE HILL OFFIC BLDG.

(SLC, UT)

CASA DEA/CASA LINDA (PROVO, UT)
CASA NUEVA APARTMENTS (DALLAS, TEXAS) 176 UNIT
CENTRAL BANK BLDG.OF CHAPEL HILLS (COLO SPRINGS, COLO)
CENTRAL BANK OF COLORADO SPRINGS
CHAPARRAL (CARSON CITY, NEV) 2 2 UNIT
CITY CENTER (SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH)
CITY CENTRAL MOTEL (SALT. LAKE CITY, UT)
CORONADO ( # 1 0 4 )

(CORONADO, CALIFORNIA) 5 CONDOMINIUMS

ORONADO ( # 1 1 0 4 )
CORONADO ( # 1 1 0 6 )
CORONADO ( # 1 4 0 4 )
CORONADO ( # 1 5 0 3 )
CORONADO ( # 1 6 0 5 )
CORONADO SHORES
CREEKSIDE (RICHLAND, WASH) 88 UNIT
CROWN APARTMENTS (WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH)
CROWN
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ELDGES NURSING HOME (RENO, NEVADA)
ELGES HOSPITAL
ELDORADO 1 & 2 (RICHLAND, WASH) 44 UNITS
GLENDALE SHADOWS (GLENDALE, ARIZONA) 138 UNIT
GLENDALE SHADOWS (PHOENIX, ARIZ) 138 UNITS
LENHOLLOW (HERITAGE) (ARLINGTON, TEX)
GRAND RIDGE N/R
HERITAGE VILLAGE
HILLCREST (RENO, NEV.) 58 UNITS
HOLLADAY HILLS (SLC, UT) 70 UNIT
HOLLADAY HILLS COMM LAND (SLC, UTAH)
ILLAHEE (RICHLAND, WASH) 83 UNIT
ISLAND BEACH CLUB
JADWIN PROF. BLDG. (RICHLAND, WASH)
KEARNS LANES BOWLING' ALLEY (SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH)
KINGSLEY PARK APARTUENTS (DALLAS, TX) 276 UNIT
MANSION ARMS (CARSON CITY, NEV)
MARK. IV & COMMERCIAL (SLC, UT) 38 UNIT
(2 COMMERCIAL UNITS)
MARINA DEL REY (GRAPEVINE, TX) 225 UNIT
MEGABAR BUILDING (NORTH OGDEN, UTAH) COMMERCIAL BUILDING
MT EYRIE APARTMENTS (OGDEN, UTAH)
MURRAY MANOR (RENO, NEVADA) 46 UNIT
NORTHPOINT (RICHLAND, WASHINGTON) 84- UNITS
OLYMPUS APT (DALLAS, TEX)
OUTRIGGER/MURPHY APARTMENTS (RENO, NEVADA)
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OUTRIGGER/MURPHY
PINECREEK (HOUSTON, TX) 300 UNIT
REDWOOD SHADOWS (SLC, OT) 126 UNIT
RICHMOND APARTMENTS (SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH)
RICHMOND
RIDGEVIEW
ROBERTA STREET
ROLLINGWOOD (HOUSTON , TX) 211 UNIT
ROSEHAVEN APT (SLC, UT) 45 UNIT
SANIBEL HERITAGE VILLAGE
SANIBEL ISLAND (2 CONDOMINIUMS SANIBEL ISLAND, EL)
SIERRA GRV/BERGIN GARDENS (RENO, NEV) 48 UNIT
SHIELDS
SOUTH CIRCLE
SOUTH LAKE SHOPPING MALL (MURRAY, UT)
SOUTHERN GARDENS (DENVER, COLO)
SOUTHWESTERN N/R
SUNDOWN EAST
SUNDOWN WEST APARTMENTS (SALT LAKE CITY,"UTAH)
SUNRISE VILLA
TAPTEAL (RICHLAND, WASH) 98 UNIT
TKUBDERHILLS
TIMBERS (RICHLAND, WASH) 267 UNIT
TOWNHOUSE APT (CARSON CITY, NEV) 26 UNIT
TRAILS (IRVING, TX)
TRI CITIES N/R
TWIN CEDARS APARTMENTS (SEATTLE, WASHINGTON)
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TWIN CEDARS
VILLA CALMA (OGDEN, UT)
VILLAGE OF GRANDRIDGE (KENNEWICK, WASH) 214 UNITS
WILDWOOD (PHOENIX, ARIZ)
WINDGATE (BOUNTIFUL, UTAH) 100 UNITS
WOODCREEK APT. (BAYTOWN, TX) 301 UNITS
WOODHOLLOW I
WOODHOLLOW II (BAYTOWN, TEX) 72 UNITS (2 STORY OFFICE)
WOODHOLLOW III
WOODHOLLOW IV (BAYTOWON, TEX)

76 UNITS

WOODHOLLOW V (BAYTOWN, TX) 246 UNITS
WOODHOLLOW VI (BAYTOWN, TX) 220 UNIT
WOODLAND PARK (ARLINGTON, TX)
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ADDENDUM
This addendum to EADAC Investment, Manivest Corporation,
and Federal Leasing, Inc. and Lewis Butcher is made to
clarify certain points in the said agreement.
1. In reference to page 2 paragraph 4, the following
should be added.
The owners desire the Developer to also assume the
position of general manager and to conduct the day to
day business of EADAC Investment and Manivest
Corporation•
2. In reference to page 3 under the heading of "Parties.
Agree" paragraph •a* the following is added.
Owners also intended to assign all of their stock in
Manivest Corporation to the Venture Agreement, as stated
in the Minutes of the May 13, 1991, Manivest Corporation
meeting.
Dated this 28 day of June, 1991.

OWNERS

DEVELOPER

EADAC, a Limited Partnership

Federal Leasing, Inc.

Lfewis Butc&irV- individually

Ernest Psarras, individually
Manivest Corporation
By sZZmc-^

i

YJ/?A&t.~y

Ernest Psarras, President
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SECOND ADDENDUM
This is the Second Addendum to the Agreement made in
Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 22, 1991 by and between EADAC,
a Partnership, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, and Manivest
Corporation as parties referred to collectively as "Owners*
and Federal Leasing, Inc. and Lewis Butcher as parties
referred to collectively, as 'Developer* •
In reference to page 3- under the heading of "Parties
agree*, paragraph a, the following is added a£ter the
paragraph added in the "Addendum* on said Agreement:
a* Owners intended to assign to the venture created by
the said Agreement, all of their Common Stock in any nonactive corporation such as but not limited to Piezo
Instruments, Inc., Olympus M.T.M. Corp., and any other
corporate stock in any other inactive corporation which may
be hereafter discovered and Owners do hereby assign the same
to the said Venture.
Owners further intended to assign to the said Venture
all of their rights under any executory contract held by
them, said rights to be managed, handled, and disposed of
thereunder in the sole discretion of the Developer; Owners do
hereby assign said rights to the said Venture Agreement«
Dated this 19 day of July, .1991,
OWNERS

DEVELOPER

EADAC, a Limited Partnership

Federal^Ii^asing ,^Tnc«

Bv Qj^JfJ

k

YAAJ^LC^

General (Partner

Angela Psarras, individually

Butci&xv Individually

Ernest Psarras, individually
Manivest Corpor;
Ernest Psarras,^President
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CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURTS
CAUSE NO.

92-7821-H

EADAC INVESTMENT COMPANY,
A Utah Limited Partnership,
ANGELA M. PSARRAS
and ERNEST PSARRAS,
Plaintiffs

S
§
S
S
S

VS.

S

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

S
OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

s
CARNICERO DYNASTY CORPORATION,
A Colorado Corporation,
FEDERAL LEASING, INC., and LEWIS
BUTCHER,
Defendants

S
S
S
S
S

160TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

^50 H ? ^

CAME ON TO BE HEARD the Motion of Plaintiffsf Eadac Investment
Company, Angela M. Psarras and Ernest Psarras, for a Summary Judgment
against Defendants, Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, Federal Leasing, Inc.
and Lewis Butcher.

The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and the

summary judgment evidence, and after hearing argument of Plaintiffs'
counsel, finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to a Final Summary Judgment
against Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, Federal Leasing, Inc. and Lewis
Butcher with respect to the Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief
pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, § 37.001, et seq. of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Accordingly, the Court

hereby orders and decrees the following declaratory relief:
A.

The April

22, 1991, agreement

between

Plaintiffs,

Eadac

Investment Company, Angela M. Psarras and Ernest Psarras, and Defendants
Federal Leasing, Inc. and Lewis Butcher (the "Agreement-), a copy of
which is attached to this Order as Exhibit "A", is executory in nature
and Defendants, Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, Federal Leasing, Inc. and
Lewis Butcher, have no rights, legal or equitable to the following
described real property situated in Dallas County, Texas:
FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1

psab03.002

EXHIBIT "B"
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BEING ALL of Lot One, Block 8118 of the City of Dallas, Dallas
County, Texas, being also known as the WENCO ADDITION, as
recorded in Volume 68143, Page 2113 of the Deed Records of
Dallas County, Texas, and commonly known as the Kingsley Park
North Apartments (hereinafter referred to as the "Property").
B.

The Notice of Interest in Real Property, a copy of which is

attached to this Order as Exhibit "BM is a cloud upon Plaintiff Badac
Investment Company's title to the Property and does not create any
interest in the Property in any of the Defendants.
C.
held

by

Any and all liens against the Property which are purportedly
Defendant

Carnicero

Dynasty

Corporation

by

virtue

of

an

assignment from The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, or otherwise,
are void.
D.

The Agreement does not provide, by itself or by reference to

some other existing writing, sufficient data or other means by which the
Property to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty. As
a result, the Agreement is unenforceable as failing to satisfy the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
E.

Plaintiff Eadac Investment Company is the fee simple owner of

the Property.

It is, further,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that Plaintiffs, Eadac
Investment Company, Angela M. Psarras and Ernest Psarras, have and
recover of and from Defendants, Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, Federal
Leasing, Inc. and Lewis Butcher, jointly and severally, reasonable
attorneys' fees in the amount of Forty Thousand and no/100 Dollars
($40,000.00).

In the event of an appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals,

Plaintiffs are awarded an additional Five Thousand and no/100 Dollars
($5,000.00) as reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees.

In the event

of a filing of an application for Writ of Error in the Supreme Court,
Plaintiffs are awarded and additional Five Thousand and no/100 Dollars Jrwtf
FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2
psab03.002
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H5,UUU.UU) aa reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees.

In the event

the Supreme Court either grants or refuses to grant Writ of Error,
Plaintiffs are awarded an additional Three Thousand Five Hundred and
no/100 Dollars ($3f500.00) as reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees.
It is, further,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that Plaintiffs, Eadac
Investment Company, Angela M. Psarras and Ernest Psarras, recover postjudgment interest on all amounts at the rate of ten percent (10%) per
annum from date of judgment until paid, and costs of court, for all of
which let execution issue.
All other relief not expressly granted herein is denied.
SIGNED this s^Sth day of March, 1993,

"?H JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pago 3
psab03.002
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11-19-93 l:24pi

Pros: Ktwin Anderson

To: Stevs Tycktsn

p. 2

Kevin It Anderson (4786)
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
50 West Broadway, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7090
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
-ooOoo—

Bankruptcy No. 93C-21748
Bankruptcy No- 93021924
(Consolidated Chapter 11)

In re
FEDERAL LEASING CORPORATION
and WENDELL LEWIS BUTCHER,
Debtors.
—ooOooSTIPULATION

EADAC Investment Company and Ernest and Angela Psarras (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "Psarrases") and Wendell Butcher and Federal Leasing Corporation
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Butcher") (Psarrases and Butcher are hereinafter
collectively referred to as a "Party" or the Parties") hereby stipulate and agree as follows:
RECITALS
1.

On or about April 22, 1991, Psarrases entered into an agreement with Federal

Leasing (the "Agreement1'). A copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A,"
2.

The Parties acknowledge that each Party asserts that the other Party has

defaulted and breached the terms of the Agreement and that such alleged defaults and
breaches make it impossible for Butcher to assume the Agreement under 11 U.S.C. § 365.
3.

The Parties acknowledge that each Party asserts claims against the other Party

arising out of the alleged defaults and breaches of the Agreement and that the Parties
mutually dispute each other's claims.
3.

On July 26, 1993, Psarrases filed a their Motion To Compel Assumption Or

of 4

Slave Tycksen

Froi: Kevin Andtrson

11-19-93 l;24pn

p.

Rejection Of Executory Contract (the "Motion"). The Motion was set for a hearing on
November 10,1993, at 3:00 p.m.
4.

To save both sides the time and expense of conducting a full hearing on the

Motion, the parlies hereby stipulate as follows.
STIPULATION
A.

The Agreement is an executory contract that is rejected pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

§ 365, effective November 10,1993.
DATED this /flfl/day of November, 1993.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK

KEVWR-ANDBRSON
ATTORNEY FOR. PS ARRASES

DATED this J&_ day of November, 1993.
DAY AND BARNEY

STEVEN C. TYCKSEN
ATTORNEY FOR FEDERAL LEASING

DATED this A _ day of November, 1993.

WENDBtL BUTCHER
PRO SE DEBTOR

Tab 7

V

ORDER PREPARED BY:
Kevin R. Anderson (4786)
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
50 West Broadway, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7090

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRL . . o i f COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
—ooOoo-

Bankruptcy No. 93C-21748
Bankruptcy No. 93C-21924
(Consolidated Chapter 11)

hire
FEDERAL LEASING CORPORATION
and WENDELL LEWIS BUTCHER,
Debtors.
—ooOoo«

ORDER REJECTING EXECUTORY CONTRACT
Pursuant to the written stipulation among EADAC Investment Company, Ernest and
Angela Psarras, Wendell Butcher, pro se> and Federal Leasing Corporation, and for other
good cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED that the agreement among the parties dated April 22, 1991, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference, is rejected
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365, effective November 10,1993.
DATED t h i s ^ Z ^ y of November. 1993.
BY THE COURT:
JO PARTIES rWMM

/

•'

GLENE.
UNTIED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

DEPUTY CLERK
U S . BANKRUPTCY COURT
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FEDERAL LEASING, INC., and
EADAC, a partnership,
Plaintiffs,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
UTAH MANAGEMENT AND
INVESTMENTS, INC., a UTAH
corporation, et al.,

Civil No. 910903217 CV
Judge Michael K. Burton

Defendants.
A hearing concerning an objection to the order and amended order
and motion to amend filed on behalf of Federal Leasing, Inc., and
Wendell Lewis Butcher came on for hearing before the above entitled
court on Friday, the 14th day of January, 1994 at the hour of 10:00
a.m. pursuant to notice. Mr. Steven C. Tycksen, of counsel, of the
firm of Day & Barney and Mr. David H. Day of Day & Barney appeared in
the interest of and on behalf of Federal Leasing, Inc. and Wendell
Lewis Butcher.

Mr. Douglas J. Parry and David M. McGrath appeared

for Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, Manivest Corporation and EADAC.
Mr. Paul T. Moxley appeared for Defendants.
Whereupon, the matter having been argued to the above entitled

.f

court by the respective parties and the court having heard the
$
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arguments of counsel and being advised in the premises and having
requested that counsel submit a proposed order for resolution of the
issues presented in the above entitled case and the court having
reviewed the orders as proposed by respective counsel, together with
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and otherwise being advised
in the premises herewith enters:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The involvement of Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing,

Inc., in the above lawsuit and their respective claims alleged in the
pleadings arise out of an agreement dated April 22, 1991 with other
parties in this lawsuit, which agreement by Stipulation and Order of
the United States Bankruptcy Court, has been rejected and said
contract has been determined by said Court to be non-executory and
Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing, Inc. have, therefore, no
longer any right to assert any interest or claims in the proceedings
now pending before this court,
2.

The following parties to this action are desirous of

entering into an agreement as a means of resolving and settling all
claims hereunder;

EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, Con

Psarras, Con Psarras as guardian for the minor , Katherine Psarras,
Anthony Psarras, Daniel Psarras, Utah Management & Investment, Inc.,
the Manivest Liquidating Trust, Swen Mortenson, Larry K. Leeper,
Herbert A. Meistreich, Phillip M. McLaughlin, Michael M. Tulman,
Elliot Wolfe and Stephen Wyatt.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now enters

its,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

As a result of the Stipulation and Order of the Bankruptcy

Court rejecting the agreement of April 22, 1991, the stated agreement
is no longer executory and as a consequence, Wendell Lewis Butcher
and Federal Leasing, Inc. are no longer proper parties to this
lawsuit and neither has any rights to further pursue this lawsuit nor
is either a necessary party to any settlement which has been or will
be reached in this lawsuit by the remaining parties, and Wendell
Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing, Inc. should be, and have requested
to be, dismissed as parties to this proceeding, said dismissal to be
with prejudice as to all parties, with the rights and claims of
Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing, Inc. against EADAC, Ernest
Psarras and Angela Psarras, and the rights of EADAC, Ernest Psarras
and Angela Psarras against Wendell L. Butcher and Federal Leasing,
Inc. to be reserved.
2. That the parties designated in Finding 2 above have the right,
without any involvement of Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing,
Inc. to enter into such settlement as the parties desire and upon
such terms as are agreeable to them.
DATED this

day of January, 1994.

Michael K Burton, Judge
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